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Mark Tushnd
By this point in the Symposium, observers will have noticed the
obvious; there is no category unenumerated rights. Indeed, there can-
not be such a category if we think that an analytic category must have
some reasonably stable content. The whole point of the so-called
category is to give us a conceptual tool to use when thinking about
rights that you can't find anywhere else, no matter how hard you
look. But, if you can't find them anywhere else, it's not entirely clear
what "they" might be. Or, more precisely, anythin can count as an
unenumerated right. Consider Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v.
Texas.2 Justice Byron White was surely correct in asserting that there
is no enumerated right to homosexual sodomy in the Constitution ,
but Justice Anthony Kennedy was equally correct in asserting that
there was an enumerated right to liberty in the Constitution.4
What, then, might we think about when dealing with the category
unenumerated rights? We could begin by observing that the term is
used in constitutional discourse by, as the phrase goes, competent
speakers. What we might do, then, is try to figure out what the term
is doing in that discourse, not in the sense, "why on earth are they us-
ing that term?" but in a sense more like, "what are they getting out of
using it?"5 People will go about answering such a question in their
own ways, and I do not contend that mine is the only correct one, but
for me the sensible approach to an answer comes through historical
and political analysis. In this short essay I do not plan to provide an
extensive genealogy of the term unenumerated rights, but will instead
be more allusive than comprehensive.
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4 decision), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (describing the claim as "having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution").
4 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (referring to "liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"). This is enumerated at least in a sense, as I discuss below in Part II.
I am here resisting a formulation of the sort, "what functions does the term perform?"
because that formulation suggests at least a more instrumentalist approach to the matter than
seems appropriate to me.
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At first I thought that this essay would deal with what Jack Balkin
has called "ideological drift."6 Ideological drift occurs when a legal
concept like freedom of speech starts out with a particular political
valence and then comes to have a substantially different political va-
lence. The case of free speech provides seemingly the easiest exam-
ple of ideological drift. From the 1920s to the 1970s or so, liberals
typically supported challenges to speech regulations because, taking
all the possible occasions of regulation into account, liberals believed
that, on balance, governments would try to suppress liberal or leftist
expression more than they would try to suppress conservative or
right-wing expression.7 Since then, though, free speech has become
conservatives' darling.8 They have used it in the culture wars to chal-
lenge hate speech regulation and antidiscrimination laws. 9 And, as
perceptive observers understood early on, it has become the modern
substitute for substantive due process as the constitutional vehicle for
challenging economic regulations.0
I had initially thought that I would describe a similar ideological
drift in the idea of unenumerated rights. The story would be the
same; unenumerated rights used to be the province of liberals, par-
ticularly with respect to privacy and individual autonomy, but has now
become the province of conservatives. The most obvious examples
come from the Supreme Court's punitive damages decisions, but
most of the contemporary Court's federalism decisions, along with
aspects of its regulatory takings doctrine, involve the judicial en-
forcement of unenumerated rights.
These cases suggest that unenumerated rights have drifted from
the left to the right. On reflection, though, I have become less confi-
dent about that statement. The reason arises from the proposition
6 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869,
870 (1993).
7 Cf MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES
FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 389-402 (2000) (tracking the Court's rul-
ings regarding political speech during the mid-twentieth century).
8 Cf id. at 431-32 ("Today, some justify limiting speech by appealing to concepts such
as... the idea that core constitutional values make certain messages illegitimate.... Ironically,
suppression theories advocated by modern critics resemble historical rationales for limiting an-
tislavery speech.").
9 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (5-4 decision) (holding that a
public accommodations law requiring Boy Scouts of America to admit homosexual members
violated the organization's First Amendment rights); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381
(1992) (ruling unconstitutional on free speech grounds an ordinance against placing hate sym-
bols on private property). Dale actually invoked a right of "expressive association" related to,
but distinct from, the right of free expression and, to that extent, might itself be taken as an
example of a conservative use of an unenumerated ight. 530 U.S. at 648.
10 See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979) (critiquing a case in which the Supreme
Court found business advertising to be protected speech).
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that, for a legal concept to drift from left to right or right to left, it
had to have been somewhere in the first place. And it is not clear to
me that unenumerated rights-and, indeed, any rights-ever were
located anywhere on the political spectrum. By this I do not mean
that the domain of rights exists somewhere above or independent of
politics. Rather, I mean to make three points. First, and perhaps
least interesting, everyone, right and left, believes that the courts
should enforce unenumerated rights. They simply disagree about
which such rights the courts should enforce. Second, as noted ear-
lier, it may be that no rights are enumerated in any interesting sense.
At the point of application or specification, constitutional text disap-
pears and something else takes its place. And third, as a result of the
first two points, unenumerated rights are always everywhere on the
political spectrum. The category certainly cannot drift and, I believe,
neither can any particular right within the category.
This essay proceeds by elaborating on those three points.
I. CATALOGUING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Here I enumerate unenumerated rights, with an initial effort at
locating them on the political spectrum. The discussion will be brief,
because other articles in this Symposium provide the particulars in
ways that need no repetition here. My aim here is to show that un-
enumerated rights have been, and are, used in the service of conser-
vative as well as liberal goals-and to resist a narrative in which un-
enumerated rights were once the property of conservatives, became
the property of liberals, and have become the property of both.
A. On the Left
The liberal versions of unenumerated rights are well-known. Con-
sider this list, offered by James Fleming as a positive description of
unenumerated rights recognized in contemporary U.S. constitutional
law:
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought
freedom of association, including both expressive association and inti-
mate association, whatever one's sexual orientation
the right to live with one's family, whether nuclear or extended
the right to travel or relocate
the right to marry
the right to decide whether to bear or beget children, including the
rights to procreate, to use contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy
the right to direct the education and rearing of children
Oct. 20061
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the right to exercise dominion over one's body, including the right to
bodily integrity and ultimately the right to die.
1'
Two issues leap out upon reading this list. First, why eight unenu-
merated rights and not ten or fifteen (if we were to break out some of
the clauses into separate rights), or one or two (if we were to sub-
sume some items into others)? Precisely because the rights are not
differentiated in some authoritative text, unenumerated rights can
proliferate or disappear, making it hard to watch them over time.
Second, and more interesting, even describing these rights as un-
enumerated is problematic. For all the criticism he has taken, Justice
William Douglas tied the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut to
several constitutional provisions. 12  The Court in Roe v. Wade" and
Lawrence located the right to autonomy in the Due Process Clause,
14
and-again despite John Hart Ely's well-known derisive comment on
the very idea of substantive due process -the proposition that the
Due Process Clause protects against substantively arbitrary govern-
ment actions goes back a long way, indeed to the Clause's origins in
the Magna Carta. 6 And, if you do not think that is good enough,
consider the proposition that the right can readily be rooted in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 7 a text that was unavailable to the
Court in Roe only because of the mistaken earlier decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases.18 The right of expressive association might be
rooted in the First Amendment,' 9 as could liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought.0
Even at the start, then, calling something an unenumerated right
seems problematic. Those who believe a particular right deserves
protection by means of judicial enforcement might accept the charac-
1 JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 91
(2006).
12 See 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (describing the various guarantees in the Constitution's
amendments that produce an implicit privacy right). For defenses of Justice Douglas's textual-
ism in Griswold, see David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 7, 31-32 (1999), and Mark Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 75, 75 (1991).
13 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
15 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)
("'[S] ubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'").
16 SeeJOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 7 (2003) (describing the Magna
Carta's influence on development of constitutional due process fights).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
18 83 U.S. (16'Wall.) 36 (1870).
19 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (describing the fight of
association as closely related to the enumerated freedoms of speech and assembly).
20 For a discussion of the connection between freedom of conscience and religious liberty,
see Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little "Con-
science," 1996 BYU L. REV. 645, 649 (arguing for a statute linking "conscience" and religious lib-
erty).
[Vol. 9:1
CAN YOU WATCH UNENUMERA TED RIGHTS DRIFT?
terization of their favored right as unenumerated, but they need not
do so: texts are available for pretty much everything-and maybe the
qualification is unnecessary. To use Frank Michelman's terminology,
perhaps there are no rights outside the domain identified by the use
of "standard legal methods, 2' because those methods are so eclectic,
flexible, and accommodating that a good lawyer can use them to ex-
plain how any particular right is compatible with the law as it is.22
B. On the Right
The conservative catalogue of protected unenumerated rights is
newer but by now familiar. The clearest case is BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, in which the Court held that excessive punitive damages
violated the Due Process Clause.3 Having rejected arguments based
on the textual Excessive Fines Clause 4 and procedural due process,
the Court majority was left only with substantive due process, as Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia pointed out. 6 The subsequent decision in State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell gives ample fuel to critics
of the judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights who worry that,
in doing so, judges simply make things up. v There the majority held
that punitive damages in excess of ten times actual damages were
presumptively unconstitutional.
Even Justice Scalia has sometimes bought into the enforcement of
unenumerated rights, though. Writing for the Court in Printz v.
United States, Justice Scalia enforced a principle barring Congress
from "commandeering" the legislative or executive apparatuses of
state government to perform national tasks.29 Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged that "there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise
21 Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 121, 126 (2006).
22 For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
23 517 U.S. 559, 562, 568 (1996) (5-4 decision). But cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Pu-
nitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 121 (2005) (observing that Gore "appears to be textually
untethered").
24 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) (reject-
ing an Excessive Fines Clause challenge to punitive damages); cf U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 2
("[E]xcessive fines [shall not be] imposed.").
25 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (rejecting a procedural due
process challenge).
26 Gore, 517 U.S. at 600-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Zipursky, supra note 23, at 110-29
(describing the Court's path in evaluating the punitive damages question).
27 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
28 Id. at 425 ("Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demon-
strate.., that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and com-
pensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
521 U.S. 898, 925, 935 (1997).
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question. '' o In other contexts that observation would have led him to
end the opinion immediately. Instead, he went on to find what can
only be called an unenumerated right for states to be free from
commandeering.
The same can be said of the Court's jurisprudence immunizing
state governments from monetary liability for their violations of na-
tional law. Initially Justice Scalia worried that such an immunity
could not be justified on textual grounds.3 ' Eventually he came to the
view that the immunity rested on constitutional structure and pre-
suppositions.3 ' And, when the Court enforced this immunity against
33suit in state courts, the disconnection between text and right was
transparent.
As with the unenumerated rights liberals invoke, these rights find
their justification in constitutional structure and presuppositions.
For conservatives, the structure is one of federalism, for liberals, one
of individual liberty; for conservatives, the presupposition is that the
national government has limited powers, for liberals, that all govern-
ments must avoid arbitrary infringements on fundamental liberties.
But the structure of the constitutional right is similar.
Even the regulatory takings doctrine is only loosely tied to consti-
tutional text. True, the Fifth Amendment refers to takings of private
property. But, as scholars have demonstrated, it is about as clear as
these things get that in the founding era, a "taking" was what we now
know as a permanent physical occupation, not a regulatory restriction
on a property owner's use of his property.3 5 When confronted with
30 Id. at 905.
31 Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495-96 (1987) (plurality)
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The reason is that the only text
bearing on the issue, the Eleventh Amendment, clearly provides immunity only against suits
brought against a state by those who are not its own citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-70
(1999) (Scalia, J.) ("Though its precise terms bar only... suits brought against one State by
citizens of another State..., we have long recognized that the Eleventh Amendment [restored]
the sovereign immunity that the States possessed before entering the Union.").
3 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758-60 (1999) (Kennedy,J.).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5 ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1999) (arguing "that the Takings Clause was originally
understood as referring only to appropriation"); William Michael Treanor, The Original Under-
standing of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) ("The
Clause required compensation when the federal government physically took private property,
but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could be used."). But
see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1553
(2003) (arguing that the natural rights philosophy prevalent at the founding informed the
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this evidence, Justice Scalia, for the Court, wrote a footnote saying
that, whatever was true at the founding, by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted and certainly by today, the concept of tak-
ing had expanded to include regulatory takings.36 Treating regulatory
takings as within the category of constitutional takings reflects a
modernist conception of property, and to that extent the regulatory
takings doctrine protects a right not enumerated in the original text.
Here we have the first reason why unenumerated rights cannot
drift from left or right, or otherwise: For something to drift, it first
has to be somewhere, and then later somewhere else. But, because
people located at all points on the political spectrum want the courts
to enforce unenumerated rights, the category is already spread out
across that spectrum. The reason, once again, is that standard legal
methods are accommodating indeed.
II. How ALL RIGHTS ARE EQUALLY ENUMERATED OR UNENUMERATED
The fact that the judges who decided the cases I have described
did not think that they were simply making things up suggests the dif-
ficulty with the term unenumerated rights. As far as I am aware, no one
advocates enforcing truly unenumerated rights, that is, rights that
have no connection whatever to the Constitution's text. Saying that a
decision enforces an unenumerated right is sometimes simply to dis-
parage the decision as entirely groundless, or, as Justice White sug-
gested, perhaps only to disparage a claim as among the weakest pos-31
sible within our system. To that extent, we have an answer to the
founders' understanding of property in a way that makes a regulatory takings doctrine com-
patible with their understanding).
36 Justice Scalia used the note to expand on his point that the understanding of Takings
Clause compact has changed and "become part of our constitutional culture":
Justice Blackmun expends a good deal of throw-weight of his own upon a noncombatant,
arguing that our description of the "understanding" of land ownership that informs the
Takings Clause is not supported by early American experience. That is largely true, but
entirely irrelevant. The practices of the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and
Just Compensation Clauses. . . were out of accord with any plausible interpretation of
those provisions. Justice Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did not
believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all, but even he does not
suggest (explicitly, at least) that we renounce the Court's contrary conclusion in Mahon.
Since the text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical dep-
rivations .... we decline to do so as well.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 & n.15 (1992) (references omitted).
37 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled ly Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution.").
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question, "what are they doing when they use the term?" The answer
is that they are criticizing or jeering or insulting the decision or
claim. In this aspect, unenumerated right is a term of abuse.
Somewhat less disparagingly, saying that a decision enforces an
unenumerated right might mean that the connection between the
right enforced and the Constitution's text is not strong enough.
Then, though, it would be nice to have some coherent account of
how we know when a connection is strong enough. Here is another
take on this point: Return to the dispute between Justices White and
Kennedy over whether there is an enumerated right that protects
gays' sexual activities; the former says there is no enumerated right to
engage in homosexual activities, the latter that there is a right to be
free from arbitrary restrictions on fundamental interests. The exam-
ple could be repeated: there is an enumerated right to freedom of
speech but no enumerated right to freedom to impose reputational
harm on others by distributing false statements about them, there is
an enumerated right to equal treatment under the law but no enu-
merated right to have government decisions made without regard to
race, and on and on. In one sense, then, questions about unenumer-
ated rights are questions about the level of abstraction on which we
are to understand constitutional language. And, I think, scholars and
judges have established that there is no analytic basis for selecting one
rather than another level of generality or specificity.
3 8
We can see this point in a common critical rhetoric about Su-
preme Court decisions. In the context of unenumerated rights, the
rhetoric is embodied in the demand; show me the place in the Con-
stitution where you find the right to privacy--or the right to an abor-
tion-located. But, exactly the same rhetoric is available, and used,
when the Court makes a controversial decision that it ties to constitu-
tional text: "You say that the Constitution protects nude dancing.
Where does it say that?" And, of course, the answer, "in the First
Amendment," is inadequate, at least to the critical questioner, be-
cause she will respond, "but how is dancing-wordless, after all-
'speech"'? At that point, the discussion gets into considerations of
free speech theory, precedent, and the like-precisely what happens
when the Court enforces what its critics describe as an unenumerated
right.
Justice Scalia's observation in Printz that "there is no constitutional
text speaking to this precise question ',39 is universally true. The reasonis that all constitutional provisions are written on a reasonably high
For the classic discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1990) ("The selection of a level of general-
ity necessarily involves value choices.").
39 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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level of abstraction, as they must be for the document to be a consti-
tution.40 During the confirmation hearings on Judge Samuel Alito's
nomination to the Supreme Court, Senator Dick Durbin tried to
make the point:
The reason I asked you about [Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v.
Wade] is that neither of those cases referred to explicit language in the
Constitution. Those cases were based on concepts of equality and liberty
within our Constitution, and the Griswold case took that concept of liberty
and said it means privacy, though the word is not in our Constitution,
and the Brown v. Board of Education case took the concept of equality,
equal protection, and said, that means public education will not be seg-
41regated.
Judge Alito responded with an extended description of Brown v.
Board of Education, in the course of which he said that Brown was
"based squarely on the language of the Equal Protection Clause," and
the "magnificent principle" of equality.4' The precise content of that
principle, though, surely is not set out in the words "equal protection
of the laws. 4 3 To make the obvious points: Judge Alito said, "the
principle that was finally recognized in Brown v. Board of Education, af-
ter nearly a century of misapplication of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is that denying people the opportunity, people of a particular race
the opportunity to attend schools, or for that matter, to make use of
other public facilities that are open to people of a different race, de-
nies them equality."4" As a critic of Brown might have said, you can
look at the words "equal protection of the laws" as hard as you can,
and you are not going to find that principle enumerated in the text.
You are not even going to find a principle of racial equality "squarely"
in "the language of the Equal Protection Clause. ' '  To get from that
clause to the result in Brown, you have to do some legal analysis, the
effect of which is to lead the courts to enforce a right specified at a
level on which it cannot be said that the right is an enumerated one.6
That is one of the things John Marshall meant in writing, "[W]e must never forget, that it
is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819).
41 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 452
(2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Durbin).
42 Id. at 453 (statement of then-Judge Alito).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 41, at 453.
45 Id.
46 One of the more amusing examples of describing specific constitutional principles as ex-
pressly set out in the Constitution is the claim that race-based affirmative action programs are
made unconstitutional by the plain language of the Equal Protection Clause. They may be un-
constitutional, but if so it is not because they violate a right whose content is given by the Con-
stitution's text alone.
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All constitutional rights are equally enumerated and unenumer-
ated. I know of no metric that would allow us to say that the distance
between the word liberty and the rights protected in Roe and Lawrence
is any greater than the distance between the words freedom of speech
and the rights protected in the flag-burning cases or the nude-
dancing cases or, indeed, the seditious-speech cases. We have to do
legal analysis that goes beyond the text, and even beyond the under-
standings at the time the relevant constitutional provisions were
adopted, with respect to all of them.
We now have a second reason that unenumerated rights cannot
drift. The category, including as it does either all constitutional
rights or none, has either too much or too little content for us to ob-
serve drift. Still, as I noted at the outset, there seems to be some
sense that something like drift seems to occur. I turn to an examina-
tion of how that sense might arise.
III. THE POLITICAL VALENCE OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
We can begin this examination by returning to the use of the
phrase unenumerated right as a term of abuse and opprobrium. I have
argued that it is available to everyone for this purpose. Its recent his-
tory is that conservatives first deployed it in this way, and liberals re-
sponded either with a freestanding use of the term or (probably less
effectively) in the tu quoque form. 4F I suggest two mechanisms associ-
ated with the prevalence of the use of the phrase as a term of oppro-
brium: denial and opportunism. The basic idea is that the term is
used as a way of suggesting without arguing that the toolkit of "stan-
dard legal methods" is, or should be, smaller than it has been. It is
only because the toolkit is so large that any right can be described as
enumerated (because connected by standard legal methods to text).
Restrict the permissible methods, and the term unenumerated rights
becomes intelligible.
* Denial: "The rights you like are truly unenumerated; the ones
we like are tied (closely enough) to constitutional text, and so are
enumerated." The question about denial is, how can it work given
that, as I have argued, all rights are equally tied-closely or loosely-
to constitutional text? I believe that the answer is that the person in
denial actually has an implicit constitutional theory that explains why
the rights he or she likes are closely enough tied to the text as to
47 I do not mean to deny that sometimes one has to do "more" work to defend the claim that
a constitutional right is violated, or even implicated, than at other times. My claim is only that
the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated rights does not track the distinction
between "less" and "more" work.
48 That is, how can you criticize us for liking unenumerated rights when you do too?
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count as enumerated, and why the opponent's rights are not closely
enough tied to text. Why, then, doesn't the argument take the form
of a defense of that implicit constitutional theory? I think the answer
is something like this: The person in denial knows or suspects that
the implicit constitutional theory, and particularly the implicit ac-
count of "closely-enough linked," could not stand up to critical scru-
4')tiny. In addition, he or she believes, probably accurately, that his or
her own demand to know where the opponent's theory is in the Con-
stitution will force the opponent to mount a (necessarily) ineffective
defense, thereby obviating the need for a defense of the critic's own
constitutional theory.50
* Opportunism: "Good unenumerated rights are good, bad ones
aren't." The speaker understands that the critical references to un-
enumerated rights are simply surrogates for underlying value or pol-
icy judgments, but believes that making such references happens at
the moment to weaken support for the bad rights. As Balkin pointed
out, there is nothing intrinsically bothersome about this kind of op-
portunism in political discourse. Indeed, it might be its most char-
acteristic feature. Put another way: when we talk about political dis-
course, saying that someone is being opportunistic is simply
descriptive, not critical.
Note, though, that we can shift our attention to opportunism as it
operates on a higher level. That is, so far I have been describing the
use of the phrase unenumerated rights as a term of opprobrium. But
there is nothing inherent in the phrase that makes it so. Indeed, one
can imagine circumstances in which the fact that a right was unenu-
merated was an argument in favor of enforcing it. So, for example, we
might think that some rights were so important at the time the Con-
stitution was written-was made text-that it literally went without
saying'that the Constitution protected those rights. 5 2 Unenumerated
49 Or that, though the theory might be ably defended by someone more skilled than he or
she, the person in denial lacks the ability to do so effectively.
50 I suspect that metaphors of visibility matter here, and that some cognitive psychologist has
shown that metaphors of visibility are more motivating than metaphors of hearing or speaking.
51 See Balkin, supra note 6, at 880-84 (discussing the concept of "theoretical opportunism" in
political debate).
5' 'Ae can see echoes of this argument in the invocation of constitutional presuppositions in
the Court's state immunity cases, see supra notes 31-33 and surrounding text, in contemporary
arguments for judicial review of congressional legislation, see, e.g., Barbara Aronstein Black, An
Astonishing Political Innovation: The Origins ofJudicial Review, 49 U. PIT. L. REV. 691, 696 (1988)
("Does this mean, ipso facto, judicial review? I think so .... Indeed the Framers manifestly
thought it, as do I, obvious enough to go without saying."), and in some arguments about the
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the
Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131, 144 (1988) (proposing that Justice Chase failed to
cite the Ninth Amendment in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), because it "went with-
out saying" that it was the source of the unenumerated rights involved in the case).
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rights might be those that are central to national identity, protected
not by specific constitutional text (or in ways only loosely tied to con-
stitutional text) but by the genius of the nation's people. 3
So, it seems, we have a series of negative results: no abstractly-
stated enumerated constitutional right has any general political va-
lence, nor does any abstractly-stated unenumerated right, nor does
the entire category of unenumerated rights. And yet, and yet-
people do seem to be doing something when they describe a right
they like or loath as unenumerated. How can that be?
At this point, I think, the right course would be to move into po-
litical history, to track the changing political valences associated, not
analytically, but in real-world political discourse with the idea of un-
enumerated rights. The reason the category unenumerated rights
seems worth talking about at this moment may be that we are at a
point of transition in that valence, so that the fact that the category
has no inherent political valence forces itself into our awareness. A
decade ago everyone knew that unenumerated rights were things lib-
erals loved. A decade hence, perhaps, everyone will know that those
rights are things conservatives love. At that time, the essays in this
Symposium might serve as reminders of an awareness that has since
disappeared-and this particular essay will seem peculiarly out-of-
date.
53 And invocation of "who we are as a people"-what Philip Bobbitt called ethical argument-
is a standard legal method. PHILIP BOBBIrF, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 94 (1982) (defining an "ethical argument" as one "whose force relies on a char-
acterization of American institutions and the role within them of the American people. It is the
character, or ethos, of the American polity that is advanced in ethical argument....").
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